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Technological innovation is perceived as the most critical force sustaining long-
term competitive advantage (McGrath et al., 1996). Cooperative innovation is 
increasingly considered an effective mean to overcome several challenges faced by 
individual firms, such as heavy investments in R&D and convergence of various 
resources (Gnyawali & Park, 2009). Due to the value-creating synergy between a firm 
and its stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, competitors, and complementors, 
the coopetition strategy (simultaneous cooperation and competition) has been proposed 
as a win-win strategy for the synergy advantage since the 1980s (Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger, 1996). The simultaneity of contradictory interactions between 
cooperation involving friendliness due to common interests and competition involving 
hostility due to conflicting interests motivates increasing academic interest (Luo, 2007). 
The extant research on coopetition is not only focused on the horizontal 
relationship (complementors and competitors) (e.g., Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; 
Padula & Dagnino, 2007; Gnyawali & Park, 2011), but also on the vertical relationship 
(customers and suppliers) (e.g., Soppe, Lechner, & Dowling, 2016; Wilhelm & Sydow, 
2018). Horizontal coopetition refers to a dyadic and paradoxical relationship of two 
firms cooperating in some activities while competing with each other in other activities 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). Most studies are mainly focused on horizontal alliances, 
which explain the roles of cooperation and competition in firm innovation, but without 
reaching an agreement. Vertical coopetition focusing on supplier-buyer dyads along the 
value flow combines price competition and cooperation (Lacoste, 2012). These studies 
mainly refer to their effects on supplier relationship management and supplier-involved 
product development. In addition, with scholars underlining the importance of multi-
firm networks, the network analysis in the trade-offs between cooperation and 
competition has started to receive more attention because of the complicated relations 
established both vertically and horizontally, involving pure collaboration, competition, 
and coexistence (Wilhelm & Kohlbacher, 2011; Wu, Choi, & Rungtusanatham, 2010; 




Pathak, Wu & Johnston, 2014). Thus, Bengtsson and Kock (2014) emphasized that 
coopetition can exist in horizontal, vertical, and even in mixed network relationships, 
all of which should be of different nature and respectively analyzed. 
Despite numerous studies on coopetition and its role in firm innovation, three 
deficiencies in prior research limit our understanding of the conditions and mechanisms 
of coopetition in different relationships. First, there has been mixed evidence on the 
positive and negative effects of coopetition, most of which are implemented through 
survey and case studies, and focused on dyadic actors (e.g., Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, & 
Vanyushyn, 2016; Bouncken et al., 2015). Second, although it is necessary to consider 
the trade-offs between cooperation and competition, there has been limited clear 
explanation on how possible challenges arising from coopetition could be dealt with 
and turned into benefits for firm innovation (Ritala et al., 2017). Third, inter-firm 
competition and cooperation in vertical and horizontal relationships, respectively, are 
of different nature and must therefore be managed differently (Bengtsson & Kock, 
2014). Furthermore, the relationship becomes more complicated with the increasing 
number of firms in the networks. The contradictory findings in network studies also 
make the effects of the complicated relationships in networks on firm innovation more 
confusing.  
Therefore, it is necessary to explore the roles, conditions, and mechanisms of 
coopetition in horizontal, vertical, and mixed relationships using large-sample data, as 
this would provide more evidence on when and how a firm can benefit from inter-firm 
competition and cooperation in different contexts. 
The study aims to investigate the influence of inter-firm competition and 
cooperation on firm innovation performance in horizontal, vertical, and mixed network 
relationships. The research questions are as follows:  
(1) Horizontal relationship: Under what conditions could the horizontal coopetition 
strategy of participants be more successful in innovation performance? 




(2) Vertical relationship: How does a manufacturer properly use their power 
involved in the introduction of competition and share control for their supplier to 
improve the supplier-involved product innovation? 
(3) Mixed relationship: Can a buyer improve their innovation performance by 
strategically managing both supplier-supplier competition and cooperation in their 
supplier network? 
This dissertation consists of six chapters, including the introduction, a systematical 
review, a study on horizontal competition in cooperative R&D consortia, a study on 
vertical dyadic cooperation for joint innovation, a study linking horizontal competition 
and cooperation in supplier network with the innovation performance vertical ego buyer 
firm, and conclusion. 
 
2. Review 
While coopetition may combine the benefits of cooperation and competition, there 
is still an inherent paradox given the possible tension between value creation and 
appropriation. Inconsistent studies on its effect on innovation may spur or/and stifle 
firm’s innovation. It may be caused by its intriguing paradoxical nature. Because of it, 
there are continuously increasing papers published in academic journals.  
Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the researches on coopetition until 2018 and 
tears out the research levels in which include individual, intra-organizational, inter-
organizational and inter-network levels. Then, it concentrates more on the accumulated 
debates on positive, negative, and even inverted U-shaped influences of coopetition on 
innovation. It also outlines the factors that can moderate the tension, heavily affected 
not only by firm-specific factors but also by the network and market context. Finally, it 
highlights several promising areas and gives directions for future research. It is 
necessary to further explore the interplay of competition and cooperation, the cross-




level research of coopetition from individual to firm and network, especially in the 
large-sample quantitative method. 
Besides, it teases out the antecedents of firm’s innovation performance in terms of 
various network indicators to review the key controversial findings in the inter-
organizational network literature. The antecedents are summarized from the structural 
and relational embeddedness of firms and properties of overall network, including 
centrality, direct ties / indirect ties, strong ties / weak ties, structural holes, closure, 
centralization, density, configuration of ties, diversity and governance. Based on these 
findings, it indicates five explanatory mechanisms with controversial nature (costs, 
resources, knowledge, trust and power) based on several traditional theories used to 
explain how to motivate firm’s innovation in networks. It is especially necessary to 
more explore the boundary conditions for the controversial researches on the influence 
of antecedents on firm’s innovation. 
 
3. Horizontal Relations: Coopetition for Innovation in R&D 
Consortia 
Chapter 3 focuses on inter-firm horizontal relationship in the R&D consortium, 
which is a typical alliance network including firms in related industries for cooperative 
innovation. It could provide participating firms with opportunities and challenges, as 
competition is often included with cooperation. The paradoxical nature of competition 
and cooperation causes a dilemma for firms in deciding how much effort should be 
committed to cooperative R&D activities. It investigates the benefits and costs of 
competition for firm innovation in the cooperative R&D consortium and identifies the 
boundary conditions to amplify the advantages of competition in terms of the network 
properties of consortia. Its theoretical framework is shown in Fig. 3.1. 





Fig. 3.1 Theoretical framework of the first study 
 
It proposes three hypotheses as following. 
H1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the intensity of 
competition for a focal firm and its innovation performance in the cooperative R&D 
consortium. 
H2: A low firms’ size disparity of R&D consortia would strengthen the inverted U-
shaped effect of a focal firm’s competitive intensity on its innovation performance in 
the cooperative R&D consortium. 
H3: A high cooperative interaction would strengthen the inverted U-shaped effect 
of a focal firm’s competitive intensity on its innovation performance in the cooperative 
R&D consortium. 
The study employs data from 649 firms in 50 Japanese R&D consortia to analyze 
the curvilinear relationship between the intensity of competition and firm innovation in 
the cooperative consortium. It was found that a focal firm with a moderate level of 
competition can gain more innovation performance than those with either a low or high 
level of competition. Moreover, it investigates the moderating roles of the firms’ size 
disparity of R&D consortia and the cooperative interaction. The results indicate that the 
R&D consortium with a low size disparity amplifies the linear effect of the competition 
on cooperative innovation, which can make the focal firm achieve more gains from 




cooperative R&D. The cooperative interaction strengthens the curvilinear effect of the 
competition intensity on innovation.  
The findings broaden an understanding of horizontal coopetition in R&D consortia, 
both conceptually and empirically with large-sample data. It also draws on social 
network theory to identify network properties of consortia as boundary conditions for 
managing the tension of competition and cooperation. In addition, it sheds light on the 
practical relevance for both the policymakers of R&D consortia and the managers of 
member firms in terms of inter-organizational relationship management.  
 
4. Vertical Relations: Buyer Power Use for Supplier-involved 
Product Innovation in Power Asymmetry Relationship 
Chapter 4 focuses on vertical dyadic buyer-supplier relationship in supplier-
involved new product development activities from the perspective of the power-
advantage buyer. As more and more firms have been increasingly recognized that 
supplier involvement in their new product development activities has a significant value, 
numerous scholars focused on how to manage the relationship and improve the 
cooperative performance. Trust is believed as one of the most critical factors in 
cooperative studies, while power embedded in all buyer-supplier relationship is ignored 
or took a negative view. The study is aimed to take a workable view of power and 
investigate how to properly use buyer power to improve supplier-involved product 
innovation in power asymmetry relationship. It focuses on two strategic decisions of 
using power including introduction of competition and share control for the supplier. 
The theoretical framework is shown in Fig. 4.1. 





Fig. 4.1 Theoretical framework of the second study 
 
It proposes three hypotheses as following. 
H1: Intensity of competition would have an inverted U-shaped effect on supplier-
involved product innovation. 
H2: Share control over its supplier would have an inverted U-shaped effect on 
supplier-involved product innovation. 
H3: Higher share control of supplier weakens the effect of introduction of 
competition on supplier-involved product innovation. 
The study takes vertical dyadic buyer-supplier relationship as the analyze unit, 
using the data of the Japanese automobile industry in the period 1994–2016. The results 
shed light on the inverted U-shaped effects of the introduction of competition and share 
control on supplier-involved product innovation. It also found share control can weaken 
the inverted U-shaped effect of competition among suppliers on supplier-involved 
product innovation.  
These findings the role of power use in supplier-involved product innovation and 
provide practical guidance for purchasing decision and supplier management. 
The study departs from the traditional negative view of power in cooperative 
activities and takes a new attempt to objectively take power use as a strategic choice 
for supplier-involved product innovation in vertical power asymmetry relationship. It 




also shifts the dichotomized purchasing decision between single and multiple sourcing 
to a trade-off decision through indicating the positive and negative roles of competition. 
In addition, the results shed light on the practical relevance for the managers of 
manufacturers on purchasing decision and supplier management. 
 
5. Mixed Network Relations: Managing Competition and 
Cooperation in Supplier Network for Buyer Innovation 
Chapter 5 focuses on mixed relationship in an overall supplier network of an ego 
buyer including supplier-supplier competition, cooperation, coopetition and buyer-
supplier cooperation. The supplier network of a buyer firm has been increasingly 
viewed as an important wellspring of innovation in new product development. The 
study is aimed to investigate the influences of horizontal supplier-supplier competition 
and cooperation in its whole supplier network on innovation of the ego buyer from the 
view of ego network. The theoretical framework is shown in Fig. 5.2. 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Theoretical framework of the third study 
 
It proposes three hypotheses as following. 
H1a: The intensity of competition among suppliers is positively related to 
innovation performance of the ego buyer. 




H1b: The intensity of competition among suppliers has an inverted U-shaped effect 
on innovation performance of the ego buyer. 
H2a: The intensity of cooperation among suppliers is positively related to 
innovation performance of the ego buyer. 
H2b: The intensity of cooperation among suppliers has an inverted U-shaped effect 
on the innovation performance of the ego buyer. 
H3a: S-S cooperation weakens the positive effect of S-S competition on innovation 
of the ego buyer. 
H3b: S-S cooperation weakens the inverted U-shaped effect of S-S competition on 
innovation of the ego buyer. 
H4a: S-S competition weakens the positive effect of S-S cooperation on innovation 
of the ego buyer. 
H4b: S-S competition weakens the inverted U-shaped effect of S-S cooperation on 
innovation of the ego buyer. 
The study takes an overall supplier network of an ego buyer as an analysis unit, 
using cross-sectional data of 130 listed Japanese buyers in manufacturing industries 
and their first-tier supplier networks in 2016. The statistical results indicate that both 
supplier–supplier competition and cooperation have inverted U-shaped effects on buyer 
innovation. Furthermore, supplier-supplier competition can moderate the effect of 
supplier-supplier cooperation on buyer innovation. It indicated that simultaneously 
keeping moderate cooperation and low competition among suppliers is the best choice 
for buyer innovation. While simultaneously keeping high competition and high 
cooperation among suppliers is also unexpectedly conducive to buyer innovation.  
The study extends our understanding of the link between horizontal coopetition in 
supplier network and the vertical relationship from a view of ego network, both 
conceptually and empirically with large-sample data. It also contributes to the under-
researched interplay of competition and cooperation indicated by Hoffmann et al. 




(2018). In addition, the study provides manufacturers for some sights on how to 
strategically manage the horizontal supplier–supplier relations from a view of the ego 
network for its product innovation. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
The study investigates the influences of inter-firm competition and cooperation on 
firm innovation in horizontal, vertical and mixed network relationships respectively. 
(a) The first study focuses on inter-firm horizontal relationships in the R&D 
consortium, which is a typical alliance network for cooperative innovation including 
firms in related industries. It investigates the benefits and costs of competition for firm 
innovation in the cooperative R&D consortium and identifies the boundary conditions 
to strengthen the competition’s advantage in terms of the network properties of 
consortia using data from 649 firms in 50 Japanese R&D consortia. It finds an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the intensity of competition and firm innovation in the 
cooperative consortium, and the moderating roles of the firms’ size disparity and the 
cooperative interaction. The results indicate that an R&D consortium with a low size 
disparity amplifies the effect of the competition on cooperative innovation, which can 
make the focal firm benefit more from cooperative R&D. The cooperative interaction 
strengthens the curvilinear effect of competition intensity on firm innovation.  
(b) The second study focuses on the vertical dyadic buyer-supplier relationship in 
supplier-involved new product development activities from the perspective of the 
power-advantage buyer. It investigates how to properly use buyer power to improve 
supplier-involved product innovation involving two strategic decisions of power use, 
namely the introduction of competition and share control for the supplier. This research 
uses data from the Japanese automobile industry in the period from 1994 to 2016. The 
results analyze the inverted U-shaped effects of the introduction of competition and 
share control on supplier-involved product innovation. It also finds that share control 




can weaken the inverted U-shaped effect of competition among suppliers regarding 
supplier-involved product innovation.  
(c) The third study examines mixed relationships in the overall supplier network 
of an ego buyer. It investigates the influence of horizontal supplier-supplier competition 
and cooperation within their supplier network on the innovation of the ego buyer from 
the view of the ego network, using cross-sectional data of 130 listed Japanese buyers 
in manufacturing industries and their first-tier supplier networks in 2016. The statistical 
results indicate that both supplier-supplier competition and cooperation have inverted 
U-shaped effects on buyer innovation. Furthermore, supplier-supplier competition can 
moderate the effect of supplier-supplier cooperation on buyer innovation. This indicates 
that simultaneously maintaining moderate cooperation and low competition among 
suppliers is the best choice for buyer innovation. Moreover, this strategy of 
simultaneously maintaining high competition and high cooperation among suppliers is 
also unexpectedly conducive to buyer innovation. 
This study demonstrates significant implications for both research and practice. 
The theoretical contribution is based on the development of the understanding of the 
coopetition phenomenon in horizontal, vertical, and mixed network relationships, both 
conceptually and empirically, using large-sample data. The inverted U-shaped 
relationships between the intensity of the competition and firm innovation are 
consistently emphasized in the R&D consortium, buyer-supplier joint innovation, and 
the supplier network of the ego buyer, although the nature of inter-firm relationships is 
different in the three contexts. This indicates that a firm can generate more innovation 
outputs with a moderate level of competition, rather than a low or a high level in the 
cooperative environment. 
In a horizontal inter-firm cooperative relationship, a firm with a moderate level of 
competition in a cooperative consortium can reach an upper bound in innovation 
performance. The firm can achieve the benefits of resource similarity and 
complementarity with the appropriate balance between the numbers of competitors and 




noncompetitors for each firm in the cooperative consortium. However, a firm would 
have a poor cooperative progress in a low-competition environment due to a lack of 
similar resources, and a declining return on innovation under the threat of high 
competition intensity created by excess of similar resources and lack of complementary 
ones. 
In the vertical buyer-supplier relationship, the introduction of competition has an 
inverted U-shaped effect on supplier-involved product innovation due to the incentive 
and the tension from alternatives. It differs from the dichotomized research on single 
and multiple sourcing (Heese, 2015), but it is consistent with the findings on the effect 
of competition on cooperative innovation in the coopetition studies. This supports the 
case of Toyota, who develop between two and three suppliers for every component. 
In the supplier network of the ego buyer, the inverted U-shaped influence of 
horizontal supplier-supplier competition and cooperation on the focal buyer’s 
innovation is discussed. Indirect links in network studies provide a positive explanation 
of the role of supplier-supplier competition while a negative role in terms of distrust 
and opportunism in the transaction cost theory is verified. The resource dependence 
theory and positive arguments on dense networks provide a positive explanation of the 
role of supplier-supplier cooperation, while the contradictory finding of a dense 
network, called network closure, confirms the negative role of high supplier-supplier 
cooperation. 
Overall, the study examines the roles of competition and cooperation in different 
contexts in combination with the resource dependence theory, the transaction cost 
theory, and the network theory. When a firm focuses on cooperation with its competitors 
in a horizontal relationship, the resource dependence theory can mainly be used to 
explain the role of competition in a cooperative consortium in terms of resource 
similarity and complementarity. When a firm focuses on cooperation with its core 
supplier in the vertical dyadic relationship, the transaction cost theory can be mainly 
used to explain the role of power asymmetry in cooperative innovation. When a firm 




focuses on supplier-supplier relationships within its supplier network, the network 
theory can provide a main explanation for the roles of competition and cooperation in 
its ego innovation. 
Moreover, regarding the inverted U-shaped roles, the boundary conditions are 
considered to explore how to manage the tension of competition and cooperation for 
prompting innovation from the perspective of the structural and relational properties in 
the network theory. As for R&D consortia, firms’ size disparity and cooperative 
interaction are considered as boundary conditions that examine the conditions wherein 
the consortia could improve the environment for amplifying the benefits of competition 
and reducing costs. Considering the structural property of the network, an analysis of 
firms’ size disparity is conducted to explore whether collaboration with firms of 
different or similar size can gain more innovative achievements with increasing 
intensity of competition. The analysis of cooperative interaction is used to verify the 
role of formal interaction in cooperative R&D among competitors, in consideration 
with the relational property of the network. An R&D consortium with either low firms’ 
size disparity or high cooperative interaction can provide a better environment to 
strengthen the benefits of competition and reduce its costs for cooperative innovation. 
Regarding the vertical buyer-supplier relationship, the introduction of an alternative 
suppliers is aimed at using buyer power to develop the structure of supply, and the share 
control of the supplier is for using buyer power to change the relations between them. 
High share control can weaken the inverted U-shaped effect of competition among 
suppliers on supplier-involved product innovation. The two studies are consistent in the 
essential logical chain of trade-off management. As to the supplier network of ego buyer, 
the interplay of network-level competition and cooperation is examined by replacing 
one with the other's boundary condition. In low supplier-supplier competition, properly 
promoting cooperation among suppliers can stimulate the innovation performance of 
the focal buyer. Simultaneously maintaining moderate cooperation and low competition 
among suppliers is the best option for buyer innovation. Simultaneously maintaining 




high competition and high cooperation among suppliers is also unexpectedly conducive 
to buyer innovation. 
In addition, the study examines the practical relevance of managers on the link 
between strategic management of inter-firm relationships and innovation performance. 
It provides guidance for balancing the trade-off of competition and cooperation and 
finding a moderate level of inter-firm relationships. 
The first study provides policymakers of R&D consortia and the sponsoring 
government with a more refined understanding of the consortium’s composition and 
governance mechanism. This helps them to establish more favorable policies under 
which participating firms are enabled to commit more effort to cooperative R&D 
activities. In particular, insight is provided to managers regarding what policies should 
be formulated to manage the entry and exit of member firms, and about the number and 
kind of events that should be organized to provide member firms with reliable 
opportunities for interaction. Moreover, it suggests that the firm’s managers need to 
select the R&D consortium with caution, based not only on the correlation between the 
research interests and the established objectives of the consortium, but also on the its 
composition and the frequency of interactive events. The firm should evaluate the 
intensity of competition for itself, the size disparity of extant participants, and the 
governance capability of the consortium before deciding to join it. 
The results also explain the practical relevance of managerial implications. The 
second study suggests that managers of manufacturers should develop cooperation 
among the purchasing, the R&D, and the investment departments for proper decisions 
on supplier management. Although supplier management is mostly dealt with by the 
purchasing manager, he or she should consider the interests of the company as a whole 
in making purchasing decisions. This is relevant not only in terms of purchasing costs, 
but also in terms of product development and vertical cooperation according to the 
applicable corporate strategy (e.g. “Cost Focus” or “Differentiation Focus”). A 
balanced strategic decision and the proper use of power can incentivize suppliers to 




work for the buyer in various ways in an asymmetric power relationship, including 
being positively involved in new product development projects. 
The third study suggests that managers should proactively establish their supplier 
networks and direct more attention to the horizontal supplier-supplier relationship in 
the entire network. It is important to select two or three similar suppliers that allow 
cooperation for each component instead of single or multiple sourcing. Manufacturers 
should focus on balancing the relational and transactional governance mechanisms in 
managing supplier-supplier relationships. It should aid cooperation and communication 
among different suppliers by setting joint projects or holding conferences, like Toyota’s 
supplier association. 
Future research could be expected to develop finer-grained empirical measures 
with panel data, provide a further understanding of the relationships in a dynamic 
network, and do international comparison with cross-country data to broaden the 
generalizability of the results. 
